RPKI is Coming of Age: A Longitudinal Study of RPKI Deployment and Invalid Route Origins

著者: Taejoong Chung, Emile Aben, Tim Bruijnzeels, B. Chandrasekaran, David Choffnes, Dave Levin, Bruce M. Maggs, Alan Mislove, Roland van Rijswijk-Deij, John P. Rula, Nick Sullivan - Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2019 被引用: 66

Despite its critical role in Internet connectivity, the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) remains highly vulnerable to attacks such as prefix hijacking, where an Autonomous System (AS) announces routes for IP space it does not control. To address this issue, the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) was developed starting in 2008, with deployment beginning in 2011. This paper performs the first comprehensive, longitudinal study of the deployment, coverage, and quality of RPKI.